Evaluating Judges by Hartz, Harris
HARTZ POST MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018 6:28 PM 
 
 
 
Duke Law Journal Online 
VOLUME 67 MAY 2018 
EVALUATING JUDGES 
JUDGE HARRIS HARTZ† 
Improving the quality of the judiciary is a noble cause. I welcome 
the participation of social scientists in the endeavor. But it is an open 
question whether social science can meaningfully contribute. Left to 
their own devices, social scientists are likely to produce work of 
dubious value. Perhaps judges can steer them to ask the right questions. 
Even then, however, the enterprise of improving judicial quality may 
not lend itself to the scientific method. This Essay addresses these 
issues in one area of research—the attempt to rate and rank judges. 
Researchers trying to rate and rank judges have high aspirations. 
Some suggest that their measures of quality can be used to select judges 
for advancement, to determine what backgrounds produce the best 
judges, and to identify models to whom fellow judges can defer. This 
response to their efforts has three parts. Part I critiques some of the 
work to date. (The critique is brief because it was the principal subject 
of a prior Duke symposium.1) It argues that ranking—and even 
rating—judges is unlikely to produce the promised benefits; that the 
measures thus far used by social scientists miss the mark; and that those 
measures, to the extent that they influence judges, could encourage bad 
practices. Part II, the heart of this Essay, lists desirable qualities in 
appellate judges. Perhaps social scientists can find methods to measure 
these qualities objectively and accurately. Part III concludes, however, 
that even if social scientists cannot find such methods, efforts to 
identify the qualities of a good judge can be beneficial if they spur 
intelligent, respectful dialogue to encourage conscientious judges to 
improve their work. 
 
Copyright © 2018 Judge Harris Hartz. 
 † Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This Article originally 
appeared on the Legal Workshop as part of the Duke Law Journal’s 2010 “Symposium on 
Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions.” 
 1. Symposium, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2009). 
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I.  RATING AND RANKING JUDGES 
Based on my observations and experience, some of the hopes 
expressed for rating and ranking judges are quixotic. For example, it 
would be remarkable if the electorate or an appointing authority made 
decisions any differently if candidates for judicial advancement were 
ranked by social scientists. Once a candidate passes the “qualified” 
hurdle, decisions are more likely to be made based on political and 
interpersonal skills. Likewise, studies of those judges who are ranked 
highly are unlikely to reveal what backgrounds produce the best 
judges; my personal experience is that excellent judges come from all 
sorts of backgrounds. And although law clerks may tend to refer their 
judges to opinions by highly ranked authors, the judges themselves are 
unlikely to pay obeisance. Most judges are independent sorts, with 
sufficient egos not to be dazzled by prestige. They do not adopt an idea 
just because it comes from a renowned person; they need to be 
persuaded on the merits. 
In addition, I question whether the task of rating judges can be 
done well, and I worry that defective rating methods can have adverse 
consequences. Recent research has attempted to develop objective 
measures of judicial quality. As some participants in this Symposium 
have observed, however, the research appears to be driven by the 
availability of data. That is, social scientists have limited themselves to 
data that can be collected from available sources and then convinced 
themselves that certain subsets of that data reflect judicial quality, 
enabling them to rank judges accordingly. But although such measures 
can be precise, they may not measure what is useful and may encourage 
questionable conduct, as has happened in response to ratings of 
educational institutions. For example, I doubt that a judge’s 
independence can be captured by counting the number of dissents or 
disagreements with colleagues (either all colleagues or only those of 
the same political party). A judge who disagrees may simply be close-
minded and unable to persuade colleagues. Worse, if a judge’s 
reputation turns on the frequency of disagreement, those seeking to 
improve their stature may try to find grounds on which to disagree, 
rather than making an effort to find common ground. Or if one 
measures a judge’s contribution to the law by how often the judge is 
cited, judges (who are well aware that the best way to get cited is to be 
the first to opine on a subject) may be tempted to produce more dicta 
and address issues not presented by the parties. 
But replacing objective measures by subjective ones is not the 
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answer. Reputation is a measure that feeds on itself, at times with very 
little of substance to support it. The compliment “highly underrated” 
can be as useful in describing judges as football players. Evelyn Waugh 
once observed that one can acquire a great reputation by being 
“dogmatic, plausible, and vain.”2 Judicial reputations are hardly 
immune from questionable influences.3 
II.  JUDICIAL QUALITY 
As the organizers of this Symposium have suggested, rather than 
starting with measures for which there are data and then deciding what 
those measures say about quality, perhaps one should reverse the 
process, deciding what constitutes judicial quality and then exploring 
how to measure those constituents. This Section responds to that 
suggestion with a list of what I believe to be desirable qualities in an 
appellate judge. Others may use rather different measures. Academics 
may be most concerned with whether the judge’s opinions are good 
teaching tools and raise interesting ideas. Attorneys may be most 
concerned with whether their clients win. Politicians may like judges 
whose opinions reach results that achieve wide popularity. 
My perspective, of course, is that of an appellate judge. I will try 
to answer the question: “What do you look for in a fellow judge?” I am 
sure that to some extent my views are idiosyncratic. But I believe that 
each of my criteria would receive the support of a large fraction, 
perhaps a majority, of appellate judges. 
Before I set forth my criteria, I would point out one possible 
criterion that is absent: to be a good appellate judge, a colleague does 
not have to agree with me. Any appellate judge with only a modest 
amount of experience would recognize that if “agrees with me” is a 
necessary criterion for a good judge, then only one judge would meet 
the standard. The simple truth is that no judge’s colleagues are as 
 
 2. EVELYN WAUGH, ROSETTI: HIS LIFE AND WORKS 13 (1928). 
 3. A study of cardiac surgeons is quite revealing. The study examined the success rate of 
the surgeons, correcting for the patient’s risk. It compared the success rates to potential predictors 
of success, such as appearance in a Best Doctor’s list, prestige of medical school and residency 
program, age, years of experience, and number of times a surgeon had performed the surgery 
during the prior three years. The only factor that had any value as a predictor (it was a good 
predictor) was the number of times that the doctor had performed the surgery during the prior 
three years. Prestige of residency programs correlated well with whether one was listed as a Best 
Doctor, but did not correlate with surgery success. See Arthur J. Hartz, Jose S. Pulido & Evelyn 
M. Kuhn, Are the Best Coronary Artery Bypass Surgeons Identified by Physician Surveys?, 87 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1645, 1645–48 (1997). 
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insightful and wise as the judge himself or herself. Criteria should be 
attainable in the real world. 
I will group my criteria under four headings: Treatment of 
Colleagues, Treatment of Litigants, Treatment of the Law, and 
Treatment of the Institution. My order of discussion is not meant to 
suggest order of importance. 
A. Treatment of Colleagues 
A good judge treats colleagues fairly. If it is true that 90 percent 
of life is just showing up, then treatment of colleagues belongs in the 
other 10 percent. Just showing up won’t cut it. Colleagues should do 
their share of both the glamorous and the nitty-gritty work of the court. 
The part of a judge’s work to which the public pays most attention is 
the production of published opinions. But a judge who focuses only on 
producing published opinions is not a good colleague. To be sure, most 
judges would like to devote a greater percentage of their time to 
working on published opinions that raise challenging issues (although 
taking a break to resolve a routine case can often bring a welcome 
sense of accomplishing something). But writing a published opinion in 
a case that does not warrant it (because it says nothing new) wastes 
paper and the time of those who feel a need to read it. More 
importantly, if a judge shirks all duties except the preparation of 
published opinions, the other, less-interesting duties are shared 
disproportionately by the judge’s colleagues. These duties include 
participating in calendars of cases that are likely to result in 
unpublished opinions, disposing of motions, and serving on one of the 
many committees that handle court rules and administrative matters. 
Judges have different interests and may prefer some of these tasks to 
others. Which they select is immaterial; the important thing is to do 
one’s share. 
B. Treatment of Litigants 
The first duty of appellate judges is to decide the cases before 
them. The process of decisionmaking must be fair, and appear to be 
fair, to the litigants. The fairness of treatment on appeal, unlike the 
fairness of treatment at trial, cannot be measured on the basis of face-
to-face encounters. Appellate judges rarely are seen by the parties to a 
dispute; and most of the time they are not seen even by the parties’ 
attorneys (and then only for a few minutes, in the highly artificial 
setting of oral argument). Thus, fairness must be assessed by reading 
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opinions. An opinion reflects fairness to the litigants when it has the 
following features: 
1. Takes Care with the Facts.  The factual context of a case should 
be stated fairly (including “unfavorable” facts) and accurately. If a fact 
is worth incorporating in an opinion, it is worth setting forth correctly. 
Not all facts in an opinion are critical to the resolution of the dispute; 
but it is important to check the accuracy of even background facts, 
because an opinion that treats facts cavalierly will suggest that the court 
has been inattentive to the case. Perhaps the easiest way for a losing 
attorney to convince a client that the court did not give fair 
consideration to the client’s contentions is to point out that the court 
omitted important facts or did not get the facts straight. 
2. Sticks to the Record.  An appellate court should decide the case 
on the record produced in the lower court. When the court goes outside 
the record, it relies on matters that the parties had no opportunity to 
contest and that the lower court had no opportunity to take into 
account. To go outside the record to resolve a dispute will thus offend 
the sense of justice of the party injured by the practice, and will also 
likely frustrate the trial court that is being reversed on grounds not 
presented to it. 
3. Addresses the Parties’ Contentions.  A party will not feel that the 
court has acted fairly if the court does not address the party’s 
contentions on appeal. This is not to say that every contention must be 
resolved on the merits. Often a contention is mooted by the resolution 
of another issue. The court also may refuse to consider a contention 
because it was not preserved below or not properly presented on 
appeal. In addition, unfortunately, some briefs are so poorly prepared 
that the court must characterize the party’s contentions differently than 
the party did, and thus the issues addressed in the opinion may not 
match the party’s listed contentions. A good judge, however, will take 
care that the opinion recognizes all properly presented arguments. I 
can understand why a court may occasionally write something like, 
“We have reviewed appellant’s other arguments and none has merit”; 
but I am not fond of the practice. At the least, I would want to state 
that the appellate court substantially agrees with the lower court’s 
analysis of the issue. 
4. Is Evenhanded.  A judge should be evenhanded, applying the 
same rule of law in a similar fashion to all parties. A judge may be 
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either strict or lenient about what it takes to preserve an issue; but the 
judge should not be lenient when considering preservation by a 
personal-injury plaintiff and strict when considering preservation by a 
personal-injury defendant. Similarly, a judge may have lenient or 
restrictive views on when parties are entitled to standing; but the judge 
should not be lenient for those exploiting mineral resources and 
restrictive for those opposed to such exploitation. Of course, there are 
exceptions to the general rule. Pro se litigants should be granted some 
leeway, so long as the court does not become their counsel. And the 
government can be expected to toe the line more closely than others. 
But lack of evenhandedness can be the most telling indication of 
appellate bias against an individual litigant or category of litigants. 
C. Treatment of the Law 
Although an appellate court’s first duty is to decide the case before 
it, the legal doctrine set forth in the court’s opinion is almost always the 
most important consequence of the court’s decision to society as a 
whole. It matters little to the general reader of the opinion whether the 
court erred in its decision because it got the facts wrong, went outside 
the record, or failed to consider an argument by the losing party. A 
distinct set of considerations governs whether a judge does a good job 
in setting forth legal doctrine. A judge’s opinions should satisfy the 
following criteria: 
1. Describe the Case Law Honestly.  Even when precedent does 
not determine the result in the case, prior case law is likely to impose 
significant constraints or be persuasive. The reader of an opinion 
should be able to assume that the author accurately describes the facts 
and holdings in cases cited in the opinion. Of course, progress (or at 
least development) in the law often occurs when precedents are re-
examined and recharacterized, and a “better” explanation is then 
provided for the results in those cases.4 But there is no reason for a 
court today to be deceptive about what it is doing in that regard. 
2. Help Develop the Law.  A good judge contributes to the 
development of the law. I do not mean that the good judge always “gets 
it right.” Early in my career I agonized about whether I was stating the 
law absolutely correctly. Then I realized that I simply do not have the 
 
 4. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) 
(abandoning the privity doctrine for product defect claims). 
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experience and intelligence to come up with all the relevant 
considerations, much less wisely evaluate them, in deciding how to 
frame a rule of law. All I could expect from myself was to work as 
diligently and intelligently as I could on the matter. I can hardly expect 
more from others. But even if the judge does not get it right, the judge 
can make a contribution by sharing the product of his or her diligence 
and intelligence. Perhaps the most important component of this 
contribution is clarity. Rather than just pronouncing the result, the 
opinion should clearly explain how the court arrived at its conclusion. 
If the judge believes that there are three important considerations 
supporting the conclusion, the opinion should recite those 
considerations and explain how they interact to compel the result. 
Others may later show that there are really four important 
considerations, but the judge who came up with the first three has made 
the analysis easier for those who follow. I value judges who advance 
the law by sharing the product of their diligent, intelligent efforts, even 
when I disagree with their conclusions. One of the joys of appellate 
judging is the interchange of ideas that leads to a better opinion than 
any single judge on the panel could produce; this interchange can be 
among judges who agree on a result, but the best work often comes 
when there is a dissenting voice. 
3. Be Consistent.  A judge should be consistent in the process of 
arriving at doctrine. For example, does the judge have a consistent 
practice in deciding whether to overturn a precedent or to apply stare 
decisis? A judge could consistently decide to overturn precedent 
whenever the judge believes the precedent to have been poorly 
reasoned; but then the judge is not entitled to rely on stare decisis 
doctrine to criticize fellow judges for overturning a precedent that they 
believe to have been poorly reasoned. If a judge bases a constitutional 
doctrine not on the specific language of the Constitution but on the 
structure created by the document, the judge cannot criticize others for 
using the same methodology to reach a result opposed by the judge. 
Likewise, judges should be consistent in applying canons of statutory 
construction and in using the results of research in the hard and soft 
sciences. 
D. Treatment of the Institution 
The authority of courts in this country is founded on the 
reputation of the judiciary. An appellate judge has a duty to contribute 
positively to that reputation. The judge’s work may well advance the 
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reputation of the judge, but it should not do so at the expense of the 
courts themselves. A few thoughts on what makes judges good in this 
respect: 
1. Persuasiveness.  Courts may have the power to rule however 
they wish. But their legitimacy is based on the persuasiveness of their 
opinions. Accordingly, I value colleagues who write coherently, 
logically, and convincingly. 
2. Respect for the Courts and the Reader.  Persuasiveness of 
opinions may be the most important factor in establishing the 
legitimacy of judicial decisions, but it is not the only one. The style and 
tone of an opinion can also advance or detract from the prestige of the 
deciding court and of the judicial system as a whole. Opinions that carp 
at or demean other judges or their work can only cause the public to 
adopt a similar attitude. And attempts at eloquence that degenerate 
into bloated prose can provide ammunition for the view that the courts 
have lost touch with the community. 
3. Modesty.  The purpose of writing opinions is not to create a 
reputation for the author. Grand pronouncements, declarations of 
“new” legal principles, and treatise-like discussions that go beyond the 
needs of the case may well establish the author’s brilliance. But they 
are at least as likely to be examples of “writing more than one knows”5 
and thus provide numerous opportunities for later judges to correct 
errors and cabin dicta. Such writing can also create an aura of judicial 
willfulness. Judicial craftsmanship often consists in explaining how the 
law expressed in an opinion follows naturally from prior case law. The 
more an author signals that the law expressed in the opinion is 
essentially the creation of the author’s brilliance, the less the reader 
will be convinced that the court’s work represents the rule of law rather 
than the rule of persons who happen to be judges. 
III.  MEASURING QUALITY 
Now that I have listed what I believe to be attributes of a good 
appellate judge, one might ask what good the list does. Perhaps some 
of the listed attributes can be measured objectively. After all, experts 
 
 5. The quoted phrase is stolen from the late, beloved Dean Lee Teitelbaum. When asked 
why he appeared unhappy despite a period of highly productive scholarship, he responded, “I’m 
afraid I’ve written more than I know.” 
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have developed ways of determining how much time it takes trial 
judges to perform various tasks; and the time may come when someone 
believes it possible to measure whether an appellate judge is doing a 
fair share of the court’s work. Also, measures that are not totally 
objective may be developed to evaluate whether a judge treats litigants 
evenhandedly or develops legal doctrine in a consistent manner. I have 
my doubts. Yet even without such measures, a list of desirable qualities 
can serve a useful purpose. The most productive engine for improving 
judicial performance is the conscientiousness of those who wear robes. 
If judges and the consumers of their work can exchange views about 
desirable qualities for appellate judges, then judges who care about 
their craft (who comprise the great majority of the profession) can 
consider those views and conduct periodic self-evaluations. I 
frequently see my colleagues borrow good practices from one another, 
often without any discussion between them. I am confident that as 
judges engage in conversation and introspection regarding quality, we 
will continue to improve the way we do our jobs. 
